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Using administrative data from a large public university, we analyze a
policy designed to increase employer-sponsored life insurance. The Univer-
sity always had a supplemental life insurance plan available for its workers.
In 2008, it increased its provision of basic coverage from a $10,000 to 1x
salary. Workers initially paying for supplemental life insurance were in a
position to completely undo the increase in basic coverage by scaling back
supplemental elections, yet their default choice in 2008 was to continue at
their existing level from 2007. The increased provision of basic coverage
therefore represents a nudge for employees to increase life insurance. The
nudge increased life insurance holdings one-for-one, both in the short and
long-run, even for workers who actively made changes to other fringe bene-
ﬁts. New hires, who had to make an active choice, elected less supplemental
coverage after 2008 relative to earlier cohorts of new hires, providing ad-
ditional evidence of a signiﬁcant degree of inertia among existing workers.
Additionally, we ﬁnd evidence of inertia for high earners constrained by
the maximum limits. Data from a national sample of job changers show
minimal crowd-out of individual market coverage from increased employer-
sponsored life insurance. Further, we discuss the desirability of the nudge
and ﬁnd that the increase in basic coverage decreased life insurance dis-
parities for two-thirds of employees. JEL Codes: D31, G22, D03, J32, J33,
J38, H20.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Life insurance ownership is at a 50-year low and sales have declined 45 percent since the mid-
1980s (Prudential, 2013; Scism, 2014). Large disparities exist between life insurance holdings and
underlying vulnerabilities with some estimates exceeding $15 trillion (Bernheim et al., 2003; Con-
ning, 2014; LIMRA, 2015b). These disparities are partially explained by many individuals' inability
to answer rudimentary ﬁnancial questions and diﬃculties associated with thinking about death and
gauging mortality risk (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2005; Lusardi and Mitchelli, 2006, 2007).
Notwithstanding these disparities, 70 percent of households have some form of life insurance
coverage, which is split between individual and group markets. The two markets diﬀer in that pre-
miums in individual markets are experience rated with extensive underwriting, while group markets
typically have some form of community rating and guaranteed issue. Previous work has focused
almost exclusively on the individual market (Cawley and Philipson, 1999; Harris and Yelowitz, 2014,
2015; He, 2009, 2011; Hedengren and Stratmann, 2015). Little attention, however, has been given
to the group or employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) market where 39 percent of households
have coverage.
In a recent paper on behavioral economic interventions, Madrian (2014) proposes prompting
individuals to make a concrete plan to elect life insurance in order to increase coverage. A diﬀerent
approach to address uninsured vulnerabilities is through an increase in employer provision. As
with any type of employer or government provision, there is the principal concern of crowd-out.
A growing literature, however, documents considerable levels of inertia that lessens the crowd-out
eﬀect (Handel, 2013; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
We use administrative data from a large public university (the University henceforth) with
approximately 16,000 employees to analyze the impact of increased employer provision of life insur-
ance on total life insurance coverage. There are two types of ESLI available for employees at the
University: basic, which is automatically provided by the employer, and supplemental. In 2008, the
University increased provision of basic life insurance coverage from $10,000 to 1x the worker's annual
salary and increased the maximum coverage from $375,000 to $1 million. For existing employees,
the choice of supplemental coverage remained at the default level chosen in 2007; to undo the nudge
to increase total coverage, an employee would actively have to scale back supplemental coverage.
The neoclassical model predicts one-for-one crowd-out for those electing supplemental coverage in
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2007.
Using two distinct samples, we observe considerable levels of inertia. The ﬁrst group we analyze
consists of existing employees who elected a multiple of 1x or 2x salary in 2007 (1,867 employees).
These individuals were in a position to completely undo the increase in basic coverage and were
not constrained by a maximum contribution limit. For example, an employee with 1x salary in
supplemental coverage making $60,000 would experience an increase in total coverage from $70,000
to $120,000 (1.17x salary to 2x salary) if they did not reduce supplemental coverage. For this sample,
we ﬁnd full pass-through of the increase in basic coverage in both the short and long-run and for every
demographic group. The second group contains highly compensated employees (making $125,000
to $187,500) who were constrained by the maximum contribution limit in 2007 and who chose
supplemental coverage worth 3x salary (86 employees). Due to the $375,000 maximum, they were
eﬀectively assigned a multiple less than 3x salary. For example, an employee making $160,000 (who
elected 3x salary) was constrained to have only 2.34x salary ($375,000) in supplemental coverage.
The policy change automatically increased both basic coverage as well as supplemental coverage
from 2.34x to 3x salary. In the case of full inertia, this policy change increased total coverage from
2.4x to 4x salary ($385,000 to $640,000). Over 75 percent of this group did nothing in response to
this change consistent with inertia.
New employees, however, are not inﬂuenced by inertia because they are required to complete a
form where they name a beneﬁciary and make an active decision regarding the multiple of salary for
supplemental ESLI. For new hires, we ﬁnd the increase in basic coverage caused a 19 percent reduc-
tion in supplemental life insurance participation. In addition, conditional on electing supplemental
life insurance coverage, employees hired after the increase elected 18 percent less supplemental
coverage. The reduction in supplemental coverage for those without the inﬂuence of inertia is con-
sistent with partial crowd-out. Therefore, we conclude that inertia drives the full-pass through of
the increase in basic coverage for existing employees.
Even though we do not ﬁnd crowd-out of the perfect substitute, supplemental ESLI, for existing
employees, it is possible that employees reacted to the increased provision of basic coverage by
decreasing an imperfect substitute, individual life insurance (term or whole life policies). We cannot
directly observe this response for the University's employees, so we use the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) and a quasi-experimental approach that examines job switchers to
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identify the eﬀect. Even among job switchers, who should be the most responsive, we ﬁnd little
substitution between employer-sponsored and individual markets with only 1 in 10 workers changing
individual coverage in reaction to changes in ESLI. If University employees react in a similar fashion,
then increases in ESLI coverage, by in large, represent increases in total life insurance holdings.
Overall, the nudge was eﬀective in the sense that it increased life insurance coverage, but was
it a sensible nudge? We analyze how employees' holdings relate to the recommended levels of
life insurance coverage. In 2007, approximately two-thirds of employees were below recommended
levels and the remainder were above. The increased provision of basic coverage reduced the average
disparity between actual and recommended coverage. Of those with adequate coverage prior to the
increase, over 90 percent had no dependents and consequently had little need for coverage.
In addition to analyzing the eﬀectiveness of the increase in basic coverage to 1x salary, we
explore alternative expenditure neutral policies. We ﬁnd that equal contributions to premiums
mitigate disparities better than multiples of salary or ﬁxed coverage amounts.
This paper contributes to the body of literature on inertia. Researchers have analyzed inertia
on the extensive margin related to default participation in 401(k) plans (Choi et al., 2002, 2004;
Madrian and Shea, 2001) and organ donation (Abadie and Gay, 2006; Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).
Additional research has explored inertia on the intensive margin in the context of Medicare Part
D choice (Ericson, 2014), retirement contribution (Chetty et al., 2014; Messacar, 2014), private
health insurance choice (Handel, 2013), income tax refunds (Jones, 2012) and Medicaid plan choice
(Marton and Yelowitz, 2015). This study primarily examines the intensive margin where employees
ﬁrst optimize and then encounter frictions that lead to inertia despite a changing default.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the policy change
and theoretical predictions. Section III describes the data and representativeness of the University
sample. Section IV provides the empirical speciﬁcation. Section V presents our results. Section VI
analyzes the relationship between the individual and non-group markets. Section VII explores the
desirability of the nudge and alternative policies. Section VIII concludes.
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II. POLICY CHANGES AND THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
In 2008, the University increased basic coverage from $10,000 (0.18x salary on average) to
1x annual base salary for all qualiﬁed employees.1 Employees with larger salaries mechanically
beneﬁted more from this policy than individuals with lower salaries. The average worker experiences
a $121 annual increase in total compensation because of the increase in basic coverage (based on
supplemental premiums). This increase in basic coverage, given no employee response, results in an
increase of life insurance of approximately 1x the employees' annual salary. Table I outlines the life
insurance parameters both before and after the increase in basic coverage.2
Qualiﬁed employees could always elect supplemental life insurance in multiples of annual salary.
Premiums on supplemental life insurance are assigned based on 5-year age bins and workers pay
on an after-tax basis through payroll deductions. Premiums changed between 2006 and 2007 and
then remain unchanged for the duration of the sample. Premiums increased by 60 and 50 percent
for those aged 18-34 and 35-39 respectively. The increased premiums could cause employees to
decrease coverage.3 If there were a lagged eﬀectemployees react the following yearthen this
would indicate crowd-out of the increase in basic coverage when it is the result of changing premi-
ums. Therefore, for those under age 40, our analysis will overstate crowd-out. In 2007, employees
were required to resubmit a life insurance elections form to update beneﬁciaries. Therefore, the
forced recalibration of ELSI made the price change more salient and if employees wanted to change
supplemental coverage, they likely would have done it in 2007. Regardless, we use older employees
who did not experience a premium change to verify the robustness of our ﬁndings.
As illustrated in Table I, prior to 2008, qualiﬁed employees could elect supplemental life insurance
at multiples of 1-3x base salary up to a maximum of $375,000.4 Beginning in 2008, the multiple
limit was expanded to include 4x and 5x annual salary with a $1 million maximum contribution
limit. The increased maximum election should only aﬀect those individuals who elected 3x annual
salary prior to 2008 or those constrained by the $375,000 maximum.
1Qualiﬁed employees include regular full-time employees or part time ≥.75 full-time equivalent and constitute 91
percent of all workers.
2The University also switched insurance companies in 2008. Both companies have identical and excellent credit
ratings. Given the straightforward nature of these life insurance policies, it is unlikely that this switch signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced participation.
3Previous studies have estimated the price elasticity of demand for term life insurance to be between -0.30 and
-0.66 (Pauly et al., 2003; Viswanathan et al., 2007)
4Individuals were assigned partial multiples if the selected full multiple would cause insurance in excess of
$375,000. For example, if an employee had a base salary (prior to 2008) of $200,000 he or she could have elected
1.875x salary to be covered at the maximum of $375,000.
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We illustrate the increase in basic coverage and the expanded maximum in Figure I assuming
that employees are utility maximizers and that life insurance is a normal good. This ﬁgure depicts
the life insurance decision for a 45-year-old employee with an annual income of $100,000. Prior to
the policy change, individuals faced budget constraint BC0 and optimally choose bundle A, which
consists of total life insurance coverage worth 2x annual salary. After the policy change, employees
were subject to BC1, which incorporates the provision of 1x salary in basic coverage and the increase
in available multiples. If an employee does not react to the changing budget constraint, she ends up
at point C with increased life insurance coverage. Optimally, the employee selects bundle B but due
to the restriction of purchasing whole multiples of coverage the individual continues with 2x salary
in total ESLI coverage. Therefore, for this interior solution, the increase in basic life insurance from
essentially 0x to 1x salary is completely oﬀset due to one-for-one crowd-out such that the individual
optimally demands the same level of total coverage. This comes from the requirement of purchasing
coverage of discrete multiples of salary and a minuscule income eﬀect. Given the minimal increase
in total compensationon the order of 0.2 percentthe likely prediction is one-for-one crowd-out
and no increase in total life insurance holdings for those with 1-2x salary in 2007.
For individuals who did not elect supplemental coverage, the increase in basic coverage mechan-
ically increases (shoves) total coverage from $10,000 to 1x annual salary. Any change in total
coverage above 1x salary could be due to perceived implicit advice from the employer or referencing
coverage based on the available maximum.
For those at 3x salary in 2007, it is likely that they were constrained by the maximum and have
latent demand for more coverage. As the available multiple increases from 3x to 5x in 2008, they
likely elect more coverage. However, if 3x salary was the desired level of coverage then they should
experience complete crowd-out of the increase in basic coverage.
Failure to observe crowd-out for employees at the interior solution (i.e. 1x or 2x) could be a result
of employee inattention or lack of understanding. The University mails beneﬁt booklets to employ-
ees, which inform them of changes and beneﬁt availability (see Appendix A). This information is
also available through the Human Resource website. Nonetheless, it is possible that employees were
unaware of the increase in basic coverage or did not understand that supplemental elections would
remain the same. Later, we use overall activity and changes in other beneﬁts to infer awareness.
An alternative explanation for not ﬁnding crowd-out could be prohibitively expensive costs of
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changing coverage. Various psychological frictions or costs exist that could cause deviations from the
rational frictionless model. Implicit costs due to the diﬃculty of evaluating the relative advantages
for the various types of life insurance can decrease coverage (Handel, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2004).
Furthermore, the psychological cost of thinking about death decreases the likelihood of changing
life insurance elections (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2005). In addition, employees needed to submit a
paper form to the beneﬁts oﬃce to decrease supplemental coverage, which represents a time cost for
changing the policy. We account for this time cost by analyzing employees that made simultaneous
changes to other beneﬁts and consequently have reduced costs for making an additional change to
supplemental life insurance.
III. DATA
III.A. Description
We use administrative (payroll) panel data from the University from 2006 to 2014.5 The data
document complete beneﬁt and retirement elections. Employees make beneﬁt elections during the
open enrollment period for the University or after a qualifying event, which include birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, or employment status change.6 All elections made during the open enrollment
period take eﬀect July 1 and continue until a new election in made. In general, employees cannot
add or drop coverage during the year except in the case of a qualifying event. Supplemental life
insurance is distinct from other beneﬁts in that an employee may reduce insurance coverage at any
time.
If an employee leaves the University for any reason his or her coverage for either basic or
supplemental life insurance lapses unless the individual qualiﬁes for long-term disability (LTD)
or the employee dies within the three months.7 This lock-in aspect of ESLI is contrasted with
individual market coverage, which is contingent on premium payments alone and not employment.
Evidence of lock-in has been shown in employer-sponsored health insurance and cliﬀ vesting for
5For the University, ﬁscal years go from July to June. For example, ﬁscal year 2006 begins July 1, 2005 and ends
June 30, 2006.
6The open enrollment period is approximately 30 days from mid-April to mid-May. In the case of a qualifying
event, all changes must be made within 30 days of the event.
7If the employee chooses to leave the University, the worker does have the option of switching the policy over to
the insurer without health screening. However, according to a Human Resource representative, the worker will pay
dearly in premiums for the policy. This is referred to as portability in the insurance contract. This university is far
less explicit than some others with respect to job related leaves and portability, but seems very similar. If a worker
qualiﬁes for LTD, the life insurance policy will end upon turning age 67.
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deﬁned beneﬁt pensions (Kotlikoﬀ and Wise, 1987; Madrian, 1994).
Table II shows the summary statistics for 23,132 unique workers from 2006 to 2014 who are
eligible for supplemental life insurance coverage. The sample is predominately female (63 percent)
and white (86 percent). Roughly half of the sample is married and over 40 percent of the sample
has a child.8 Faculty make up less than 20 percent of the sample. In addition to the main campus,
the University operates a hospital. The relative employment share for healthcare increased 17
percentage points over the period; all healthcare workers are classiﬁed as staﬀ.9 The data report
annual base salary in thousand dollar increments top-coded at $375,000. Median salary increased
in nominal terms from $38,000 to $46,000 over the 9 years of the sample. This value does not take
into account bonuses, raises that occur during the year, or summer ninths.
Health ﬂexible spending account (FSA) participation increased 3 percentage points (from a base
of 16 percent). Health FSA participation is an indicator of active participation in beneﬁt elections,
as FSAs require that employees actively specify a contribution amount each year.
Supplemental life insurance participation increased until 2008 and then decreased from 56percent
to 48 percent in the course of six years. The second panel of Table II and Figure II break out
supplemental life insurance participation by diﬀerent demographic groups. The participation proﬁle
is hump-shaped with respect to age and peaks between ages 40 and 45. Life insurance's primary
purpose is to replace the lost earnings of a breadwinner, which means as the individual approaches
retirement demand might decrease as potential lost earnings decrease. For employees under age 55,
participation rates increased from 2006 to 2008 and then consistently fell for the remainder of the
sample. As shown in the ﬁgure, the youngest employees experience the greatest decline. For those
under age 35, participation dropped from 46 percent in 2008 to 29 percent in 2014. No decline exists
for employees older than 50. Crowd-out from the increase in basic coverage, increased premiums,
recessionary forces, or a general trend in society, could be driving this decline in supplemental life
insurance participation.
Table II further shows how income levels inﬂuence participation. For employees that make less
8We do not observe marital status or children directly in the data. The variables are determined based on health,
dental, vision, and dependent life insurance elections as well as dependent ﬂexible spending account (FSA). If an
employee ever elects either spousal or family insurance (of any type) then the individual is categorized as Married in
Sample. Similarly, if an employee elects child or family insurance (of any type) or uses a dependent FSA then they
are classiﬁed as having a Child in Sample. This measure will not pick up individuals who have alternative sources
of insurance such as a spouse's employer. In addition, this variable will miss individuals with children who are no
longer dependents.
9Even though we do not explicitly observe education, the position of faculty or staﬀ at the main campus is
correlated with level of education (Brown and Previtero, 2014).
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than $100,000, there is the same trend of increasing participation up to 2008 followed by steady
signiﬁcant decline. This trend exists for faculty, staﬀ, main campus, and healthcare employees.
Faculty are less likely to hold supplemental ESLI in comparison to staﬀ for every year except 2006.
This perhaps could be the result of diﬀerential participation in the individual term life insurance
market. There are no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences.
III.B. Representativeness
Many universities publish online beneﬁts booklets through their human resource oﬃces with
varying degrees of detail on fringe beneﬁts, including ESLI. We collected beneﬁts booklets in 2014
from more than 400 institutions. Of these, we select 70 institutions that have well-documented
information on both basic and supplemental life insurance coverage. The beneﬁt booklets for many
institutions were missing details on life insurance and we are hesitant to conclude that such insti-
tutions do not oﬀer coverage. Nearly 70 percent of employees across all occupations are oﬀered
life insurance coverage, and the take-up rate is 80 percent. Additionally, half of all employees are
oﬀered supplemental coverage (LIMRA, 2015a).
Although many diﬀerences exist across universities with respect to their provision of life in-
surance, several common features emerge for the 70 institutions examined. First, premiums are
community rated, often with ﬁve-year age bins, similar to the University in this study. Virtually all
institutions have an open enrollment period where new employees can purchase coverage without
underwriting and where the issuance of policy is guaranteed.
Second, a large majority of basic plans are a multiple of salary. Of the 70 plans, 30 percent
had basic coverage at 1x salary, 17 percent at 1.5x salary, and 24 percent at 2x salary. Thus, the
University's design of its basic plan from 2008 onward is representative of a much larger set of
institutions, both in terms of structure and generosity. Almost all of the remaining plans (12 of
the 20 that were not multiples at 1x, 1.5x or 2x salary) oﬀered a ﬂat dollar amount of coverage,
most often in the range of $20,000 to $50,000. Such ﬂat dollar life insurance plans mimic the basic
structure at the University prior to 2008 (where the ﬂat dollar amount of $10,000 was considerably
lower than most plans).
Third, almost half of institutions scale back basic life insurance coverage once employees reach
a threshold age, often 65 or 70. Relative to younger employees, the payout typically falls by at least
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35 percent. In 2008, the University adjusted the coverage such that payouts fell to a ﬂat amount of
$10,000, rather than 1x salary, once an employee reached age 70.
Fourth, three-quarters of supplemental plans also oﬀer coverage in multiples of salary, with
maximum payouts that will be binding for higher paid employees. The most common maximum
multiple is 5x salary, with a range from 2x to 10x salary. The University's change in 2008 brought the
supplemental maximum in line with other universities. The remaining one-quarter of supplemental
plans oﬀer ﬂat dollar amounts, which allows lower paid employees to purchase far greater multiples
of their salary. The most common ﬂat dollar amount is $500,000.
Table III combines and summarizes some of the salient features for the 70 universities into a
maximum eﬀective salary multiple (i.e. total coverage divided by salary). The combination basic
and supplemental plans, multiples of salary and ﬂat dollar amounts, age adjustments and maximum
payouts has implications for the degree of total coverage that an employee can obtain from ESLI.
We present the eﬀective salary multiple for three types of earners ($35k, $100k and $400k) and two
ages (age 30 and age 65). Several ﬁndings emerge. Lower compensated employees typically have the
potential to replace more of their salary through life insurance, both due to plans with ﬂat payout
and binding maximums on higher paid employees. The median eﬀective multiple is 6.5x salary for
young employees making $35k, 6.0x salary for those making $100k, and just 2.2x salary for those
making $400k. Second, since the majority of plans do not have steep drop oﬀs based on age, the
medians are similar for 65 year olds, but in some cases, the drop oﬀs can be quite substantial. For
example, a 65-year-old at Michigan State University making $100k can replace just 5.7x her salary,
while a 30-year-old can replace 8.5x her salary. The University considered in this study, after the
policy change, falls below the median eﬀective salary multiple for most employees.
The University can also be compared to the more systematic collection of data from the March
2013 National Compensation Survey (NCS)(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Evidence is presented
in Table IV. Across all industries, 60 percent of employees have access to ESLI, and take-up of the
beneﬁt is virtually complete. Employees in higher education have far greater access to ESLI, and
access is higher still at the University. Consistent with the sample of 70 institutions, the most
common form of ESLI is as a multiple of earnings, which is approximately twice as prevalent as ﬂat
dollar contributions. In addition, for ESLI plans that are designed as a multiple of salary, almost
twice as many cover employees at 1x salary as at 2x salary. Among ﬂat dollar plans, the median
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payment is $20,000, somewhat lower than the sample of 70 institutions.
In summary, data collected from beneﬁts booklets and from the NCS suggest that the University
made changes in 2008 that brought its life insurance oﬀering from below average to the norm for
colleges and universities. The NCS demonstrates that colleges as a whole tend to be more generous
than other industries in the provision of ESLI, but the design of the University's planas a multiple
of 1x earningsis quite common for a broad range of workers.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
IV.A. Existing Employees at the Interior
To test the inﬂuence of inertia, we restrict the analysis to those employees that elected either
1x or 2x annual salary in 2007 (interior solution) for whom the increase in basic coverage represents
a nudge.10 The simultaneous increase in the available multiples from 3x to 5x coverage should
not inﬂuence this population since by revealed preference they demand a multiple lower than the
maximum. In addition, they have the ﬂexibility to reduce supplemental coverage to oﬀset the
increase in basic coverage. We use the following ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation to test the eﬀect of the
increase in basic coverage.
(1) TotalCoverageit = β1Postt + β2Xit + αi + εit
TotalCoverageit represents the total coverage (basic+supplemental) in multiples of income for
individual i at time t, Xit is a vector of covariates that vary across time (income, age, and main
campus vs. healthcare assignment), and Postt is an indicator variable equal 1 for years following
the increase in basic coverage. If β1 is zero, then there is no evidence of inertia. The individual
ﬁxed eﬀect, αi, controls for unobserved heterogeneity such as risk aversion, latent health, and
human capital. We explicitly look at employees who elected coverage of 1-2x salary in 2007 (interior
solution) who were able to completely undo the increase in basic life insurance by reducing their
supplemental coverage. This group constitutes 22 percent of the sample of existing employees.
10This sample additionally excludes those that elected 2x salary in 2007 and had a salary greater than $125,000
and those that elected 1x salary who had a salary greater than $187,500 because they were potentially constrained
by the maximum coverage limit of $375,000. This exclusion represents 1 percent of those at the interior.
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IV.B. New Hires
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of the increase in basic coverage for new hires. Several studies have
shown that new hires respond more to changes in beneﬁt pricing and more frequently elect new
options relative to existing employees (Handel, 2013; Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988; Strombom et al., 2002). New hires at the University are required to actively
choose (no default) if they want supplemental coverage or just basic coverage in addition to listing
a beneﬁciary for basic life insurance. Therefore, in the absence of inertia, new hires should have
been less likely to opt into, and choose lower levels of, supplemental coverage after the increase in
basic coverage.
Summary statistics for cohorts of new hires within 2 years of the increase in basic coverage
(4,298 employees) are presented in Table VIII. The diﬀerence in the basic life insurance multiples
mechanically reﬂects the policy change, whereas the decrease in supplemental coverage on the ex-
tensive margin (any participation) gives evidence of crowd-out. The multiple of coverage conditional
on participation increased potentially due to non-participation by those that initially selected the
lowest multiples. The table also shows that the extensive margin response in supplemental life
insurance coverage is driven from employees at the main campus. Demographics are very similar
across the hiring cohorts except for an increase in age primarily driven by the healthcare sector.
Individuals hired after the change receive a higher nominal salary coming mainly from increased
salaries in the main campus. The greatest diﬀerence is that in 2008 and 2009, the University hired
signiﬁcantly more healthcare positions relative to the main campus. We explicitly control for these
diﬀerences in the empirical speciﬁcation using a rich set of controls.
To formally test the hypothesis of no crowd-out among new hires, we estimate the following
model:
(2) Supplementali = γ0 + γ1Hired Posti + γ2Xi + i
where Supplementali represents either having life insurance (linear probability) or the multiple of
salary in coverage (Tobit) depending on the speciﬁcation. Xi represents demographic, family, and
employment variables used to control for diﬀerences present in Table VIII. In addition, we include
controls for dental and vision insurance elections to account for diﬀerences in demand for fringe
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insurance beneﬁts. Hired Posti represents being hired after the increase in basic coverage. If γ1 is
signiﬁcantly less than zero, then we reject the hypothesis of no crowd-out.
V. RESULTS
V.A. Impact on Existing Employees: Complete Inertia
We illustrate the inﬂuence of increased basic life insurance in Figure III for employees who are
at an interior solution in 2007. The ﬁgure provides strong evidence of inertia and that the nudge
signiﬁcantly increased total life ESLI coverage.
To formally test this ﬁnding, we estimate the ﬁxed eﬀect regression given in equation (1). We
use the two years on either side of the policy change to capture the short-run eﬀects. In the ﬁrst
column of Table V the coeﬃcient on Post Changet indicates that the average increase of 0.74x salary
in basic life insurance (from $10,000 to 1x salary) caused an increase in multiple of total coverage
(basic + supplemental) of 0.78x salary. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of full pass-through of
the increase in basic coverage into total coverage (between 98 and 113 percent pass-through at the
95 percent conﬁdence level). This result provides strong evidence that existing employees did not
respond to the change in the default level of coverage.
We next consider employees between the ages of 40-44 and 60-64 who did not experience premium
changes in 2007 and consequently represent our cleanest sample. This age restriction leads to the
same conclusion as the full sample that we cannot reject full pass-through of the increase in basic
coverage. We then restrict the sample to include just those individuals aged 18-39. As mentioned,
these individuals experienced a sizable increase in premiums (50 to 60 percent) in 2007, one year
before the change in basic coverage. If employees react the following year to the price increase
then this would indicate crowd-out of the increase in basic coverage. The premium change for this
age group should exaggerate any crowd-out that we ﬁnd or equivalently should understate inertia.
The third column of Table V shows that for a 0.71x salary increase in basic coverage, employees
increase total coverage by 0.81x salary. Once again, we conclude full pass-through of the increase in
basic coverage even with any inﬂuence of the premium increase. In addition, we examine employees
that experienced an increase in premium due to aging into a higher premium bracket in 2008 and
continue to ﬁnd full pass-through of the increase in basic coverage.
High earners experience the largest increase in basic coverage and therefore should be the most
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likely to decrease supplemental coverage. For example, someone making $30,000 mechanically re-
ceived $20,000 more basic coverage whereas someone making $100,000 received an additional $90,000
in basic coverage. The fourth column shows that the result of full pass-through holds even when we
restrict the analysis to the highest earning quartile. Additionally, we cannot reject the hypothesis
of full pass through when we break out the sample by faculty and main campus staﬀ.
If employees were unaware of the increase in basic life insurance coverage then they would not
have reacted to the policy and we would conclude that it is inertia. To investigate this concern, we
examine employees that changed other portions of their beneﬁt packages in 2008. The University
lists in an introductory page a brief summary of the changes that occurred beginning that ﬁscal
year. Individuals that made changes to any election likely consulted the University's beneﬁts book
and were more likely informed about the change in life insurance coverage. The ﬁrst column of
Table VI restricts the sample to individuals that changed any other election (health, vision, dental,
etc.) in 2008 and that elected 1-2x coverage in 2007. Even with this restriction, we continue to ﬁnd
full pass-through of the increase in basic coverage.
A potential concern is that individuals that changed a single election only looked at that speciﬁc
beneﬁt (i.e. health FSA) and did not even notice the change in basic life insurance. To address
this, we further restrict the sample to individuals who make changes to a beneﬁt election located
on the same page as life insurance in the beneﬁt book. This increases the likelihood that employees
are aware of the change in life insurance. We further expand this by varying the sample based on
changing beneﬁts listed in varying proximity to life insurance in the beneﬁts book. Through all of
these speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd more than full pass-through of the increase in basic coverage, which
provides stronger evidence that the pass-through is not merely a result of unawareness.
Although in the short-run we ﬁnd strong evidence of inertia, the increased coverage could be
crowded-out over a longer time horizon. Using continuously employed workers from 2006 to 2010,
2012 and 2014 respectively we see how those individuals initially at the interior (1-2x salary) react.
In 2009, the university added the option to make elections online, which should reduce the time
costs of changing supplemental coverage and increase the likelihood of crowd-out. The ﬁrst column
of Table VII gives an estimate for years 2006 and 2007 in comparison to 2009 and 2010 just two
and three years after the change and we fail to reject full pass-through even with the addition of
online elections. The second column compares the same pre-period with 2011 and 2012 as the post
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period. The coeﬃcient decreases, in relation to the short-run eﬀect, but we still cannot reject full-
pass-through. The third column shows that even six years after the change, we still cannot reject
the hypothesis of full pass-through with a 0.74x salary increase in basic coverage resulting in a 0.58x
salary increase in total coverage.
Other possible explanations for the increase in total coverage include reference-dependent pref-
erences and implicit advice (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; K®szegi and Rabin, 2006). For example,
employees could have referenced their elected coverage based on the maximum available. Therefore,
when the options expanded, the employee could have purchased a larger amount of coverage in
relation to the new higher maximum. Additionally, employees could take the increase in available
multiples as implicit advice from the employer that they need more coverage. The announcement
of increased coverage by the employer also could have induced individuals to re-evaluate their life
insurance needs and optimally elect more coverage.
To gauge these inﬂuences, we look at individuals who did not elect supplement coverage in
2007 and experienced a 1x salary mechanical increase (a shove) in life insurance coverage in
2008. Of those at 0x salary in 2007, 7 percent began electing supplemental coverage in 2008.
This 7 percent can be interpreted as the inﬂuence of the implicit advice or reference-dependent
preferences. Decreasing marginal returns imply that individuals with some supplemental coverage
are relatively less likely to react to implicit advice. Therefore, an increase in coverage for 7 percent
of this subsample could represent an upper bound for those with supplemental coverage. However,
the sample of individuals that elect no supplemental coverage could be substantively diﬀerent from
those that elect a positive multiple of coverage. Therefore, this increase of 7 percent due to implicit
advice or referencing might explain part of the lack of crowd-out but falls short of fully explaining
the robust ﬁndings of inertia.
V.B. Impact on New Hires: Partial Crowd-out
Next, we examine the extensive margin (participation in supplemental coverage) for new hires at
the University who should exhibit less inertia relative to existing employees. We restrict the sample
to the ﬁrst observation for individuals hired between 2006 and 2009.11 The ﬁrst columns of Table IX
give the linear probability model results from equation (2) with supplemental participation as the
11We use the ﬁrst observation because individuals hired during the ﬁscal year do not appear in the data until the
following ﬁscal year.
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dependent variable. The ﬁrst column shows that on the extensive margin, individuals hired after
the increase in basic coverage are 9.4 percentage points less likely to elect supplemental coverage
from a base of 50 percent participation consistent with the theoretical prediction of crowd-out.
Those under age 40 experienced increased premiums in 2007on the order of 50 to 60 percent
which would bias our results toward ﬁnding larger crowd-out eﬀects. We break out the response
by ages to address this concern. The same approximate reduction holds for those 40 and over
who experienced smaller premium changesranging from 0 to negative 12 percentas well as
those under 40.12 Through all speciﬁcations, having a child or spouse increases supplemental life
insurance participation.
We next estimate a Tobit model to analyze how the change in basic coverage inﬂuenced the
intensive margin for supplemental coverage. We use a Tobit model to account for individuals who
select 0x salary in supplemental coverage and for those that are restricted to purchasing 3x annual
salary before the change and 5x annual salary following the change. The latter columns of Table
IX presents the marginal eﬀects from equation (2) with multiple of supplemental coverage as the
dependent variable. The coeﬃcient on Hired Post Change in the fourth column implies that
the increase in basic coverage caused a multiple reduction of 0.19x salary for those who selected
an interior multiple. The other columns show that this result does not signiﬁcantly vary across
diﬀerent age groups despite the premium changes in 2007.13
Overall, for new hireswho presumably exhibit less inertiathe increase in basic coverage
caused a decrease in supplemental life insurance participation by 19 percent. In addition, conditional
on electing supplemental coverage, the increase in basic life insurance induced an 18 percent decrease
in the amount of coverage elected. These new hire results provide evidence that the lack of crowd-out
of supplemental coverage for existing employees is a result of inertia.
V.C. Highly Compensated Employees: Additional Evidence of Inertia
Yet another example of inertia can be found with highly paid employees in 2007 that were
constrained at a maximum contribution of $375,000 but that were not constrained by the 3x salary
restriction. Individuals that made between $125,000 and $187,500 could not have 3x salary in
12For new hires 40 and over, this speciﬁcation could understate the existence of crowd-out due to the slight (0 to
12 percent) decrease in premiums.
13Ordered Probit estimates have consistent qualitative results showing that the increase in basic coverage decreased
supplemental coverage for new hires.
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coverage due to the $375,000 maximum prior to 2008.14 For example, an individual that made
$160,000 and selected 3x salary would have been assigned a multiple of 2.34 due to the $375,000
limit prior to 2008 despite having picked a whole multiple. The individuals that were constrained
by the maximum automatically increased in 2008 to the multiple that they choose previously (in
this case 3x salary). Therefore, the policy change not only increased their basic coverage, but also
increased their supplemental coverage above what they had.
Among these individuals, many of them presumably had latent demand for more life insurance,
which could have been realized following the expansion of the maximum and lead to an election
of 4x or 5x salary. Alternatively, they could have satisﬁed their latent demand for life insurance
by purchasing individual market life insurance. In this case, they should decrease supplemental
coverage to oﬀset the increased basic life insurance and automatically increased partial multiple of
supplemental coverage. Doing nothing in 2008 is an abnormal reaction and indicative of inertia. Of
those that were constrained by the $375,000 maximum in 2007 (86 employees), 14 percent increased
to a multiple of 4x or 5x annual salary (latent demand), and 7 percent reduced their election (crowd-
out). The remaining 79 percent simply allowed a mechanical increase in supplemental coverage to
3x annual salary. Even 3 years after the change over 70 percent remained at 3x salary in coverage.
This result provides another example of employees electing coverage and then not responding to
external factors that inﬂuence their total coverage.
VI. INDIVIDUAL MARKET CROWD-OUT
The market for life insurance diﬀers from other major forms of insurance (such as health insur-
ance prior to the Aﬀordable Care Act) in that there exists an employer market and a well-functioning
individual market. Individual and ESLI diﬀer in that individual policies are experience rated (in-
dividually underwritten) and ESLI policies are generally community rated. Additionally, ESLI is
conditional on employment whereas term life insurance is merely conditional on premium payments.
The experience rating in the individual market also represents an additional cost (time, blood tests,
lengthy questionnaires, etc.) in comparison to ESLI costs. Notwithstanding these diﬀerences, an
individual market term policy is an imperfect substitute for ESLI in terms of actual insurance pro-
vided. Therefore, even in the absence of the most natural form of crowd-out (supplemental ESLI),
14In addition, those that made between $187,500 and $375,000 would only have coverage of less than 2x salary.
However, this group could have elected either 2x or 3x salary and either way be constrained by the $375,000 maximum.
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it is possible that employees reduced or lapsed individual market policies as basic ESLI increased.
The University data do not provide information on employees' individual market life insurance
coverage. To understand this relationship, we turn to the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP), which has information on holdings from the employer-sponsored market and implicit
information on holdings from the individual life insurance market. These data have been used in
recent studies on demand for life insurance (Harris and Yelowitz, 2014, 2015; Hedengren and Strat-
mann, 2015). This nationally representative longitudinal sample is constructed through individual
interviews in four-month intervals known as waves. Each wave contains responses regarding income,
labor force activity, and participation in government assistance programs. In addition to the core
monthly questions, the survey covers less-frequently asked subjects in topical modules. The wealth
topical modules contain detailed information on assets and liabilities (including life insurance hold-
ings) and are asked at least twice per panel for the survey years used in this analysis. We use SIPP
panels from 1996 to 2008 and limit our sample to individuals aged 18 to 64.15,16
The SIPP, although the most suitable data set to explore this relationship, is subject to mea-
surement error for individual life insurance. The survey explicitly asks about insurance purchased
through an employer and about total life insurance coverage. The diﬀerence between total and
ESLI holdings allows us to infer individual life insurance holdings. This indirect approach of deter-
mining the extensive margindoes the person have individual life insurance or notis inexact due
to diﬀerential top coding for ESLI and total life insurance. For example, for the 1996 panel, total
holdings are truncated at $999,000 and ESLI holdings are truncated at $400,000. If a worker's ESLI
holdings exceed $400,000, it is not possible to conclusively infer individual life insurance holdings.
Additionally, prior to the 2004 panel, the survey asks about the face value of policies (the amount
that would be paid out at death) which applies to all types of life insurance policies. However,
for the 2004 and 2008 panels, the questions changed to asking about the cash value of a policy,
which only applies to life insurance with an investment portion, primarily whole life insurance.
Gottschalck and Moore (2006) show that a majority of respondents did not understand the dis-
tinction between cash and face value and continued to report face value even though the question
asked cash value. However, if individuals who only had term life insurance accurately responded
15Following Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), we exclude imputed values for life insurance due to criticism of the SIPP
wealth imputation methodology by researchers (Hoynes, Hurd, and Chand, 1998).
16Earlier panels of the SIPP do not allow repeat observations of ESLI and individual market elections. Our
identiﬁcation strategy relies on following individual life insurance elections across time which precludes their use.
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to the question following the change, then there would be no way of determining if they had both
ESLI and individual life (if they did not have ESLI then indicating they had insurance indicates
individual life insurance). In summary, the indicator for individual life insurance is measured with
error.
Figure IV shows that total, ESLI and individual market life insurance all have decreasing par-
ticipation over time. Those that held some form of life insurance decreased from 50 to 32 percent
from 1996 to 2011. These declines are consistent with industry-level ﬁndings that ownership of life
insurance is at a 50-year low (Prudential, 2013).
A simple correlation between ESLI and individual life insurance indicates a positive relationship.
This could come from the correlation of higher income workers with ﬁrms that oﬀer life insurance or
represent strong preferences for insurance manifesting itself by having life insurance in both markets.
Looking past a simple correlation, we turn to a quasi-experimental approach that examines how
job changers react to diﬀerences in ESLI oﬀerings from diﬀerent ﬁrms. Employment changes are
endogenous, but these changes are arguably orthogonal to changes in life insurance preferences, much
like retirement savings (Chetty et al., 2014). ESLI oﬀerings vary tremendously across industry as
seen in both the NCS and in the SIPP, yet take up is very high. For example, in the SIPP, 7 percent
of administrative workerswhere duties/quality of the job is thought to be fairly homogeneous
in employment services have ESLI whereas 61 percent of hospital administrative workers have
ESLI.17 Therefore, a change in workplaces could induce an exogenous increase or decrease in ESLI
that will be our source of identiﬁcation for the following ﬁxed eﬀect regression.
(3) Individual Lif eit = δ0ESLIit + δ1Xit + αi + uit
Individual Lif eit is an indicator for holding individual life insurance, ESLIit is an indicator for
employer-sponsored coverage, Xit is a vector of time varying covariates, αi is the individual ﬁxed
eﬀect, and uit is the error term.
We restrict our analysis to the year an individual switches employment and the year preceding
the change. We only consider changes from one employer to another and only those that do not
experience drastic changes in earned income (Chetty et al., 2014).18
17See Ahn and Yelowitz (2015) for an example of this type of analysis on paid sick leave.
18We deﬁne a job change based on a change in employer id and a start date between periods or a change in
occupation code. We limit the sample to employees who experienced a change in income from 50 to 150 percent of
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Table X shows the results from equation (3). The ﬁrst column shows that relatively few, 1 in
10, workers have individual market life insurance crowded-out by ESLI. The second column only
considers individuals that switch industries but keep the same occupational code in an attempt
to hold constant factors other than the changing life insurance beneﬁts. The crowd-out from this
speciﬁcation increases slightly implying that receiving (losing) ESLI causes a 14 percentage point
reduction (increase) in the probability of having individual life insurance coverage. Individuals could
diﬀerentially respond to gaining ESLI in comparison to losing ESLI coverage. Columns 3 limits the
sample to job changers who either gained ESLI following a job change and those that experience
no change in ESLI coverage as a result of switching jobs. Column 4 similarly looks at those that
lose ESLI coverage in comparison to those that do not experience a change in ESLI coverage. The
results show individuals are more likely to lapse individual market life insurance coverage when they
get ESLI than they are to get individual market coverage in response to losing ESLI.
The last speciﬁcation examines individuals of diﬀering health. Presumably, individuals in better
health should react more to changes in ESLI because they face lower premiums in the individual
market. The last two columns show that individuals in excellent health are more likely to experience
crowd-out in comparison to those in good health consistent with underwriting.
It is possible that even though roughly 9 in 10 did not react to a change in ESLI in the year of
the job change more workers could have reacted in the subsequent years. For example, individuals
could let their term policy lapse rather than renewing the policy when it ends. Therefore, two
periods may not adequately capture crowd-out. To partially address this concern, we restrict our
sample to individuals who change jobs and then stay at the new job for an additional year in the
sample. Given that the job change occurred in year t, we use years t − 1 and t + 1 in the ﬁxed
eﬀect regression. If there is a lagged eﬀect, we should see crowd-out increase in the second year
relative to the ﬁrst as more people adjust to the change. Table XI shows that crowd-out from one
year is roughly equivalent to the crowd-out after two years. This does not rule out the possibility
of future lagged crowd-out eﬀects, but it does suggest that the cumulative crowd-out is likely not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the initial crowd-out.19
Among job changers, across a wide variety of speciﬁcations, between 85 and 90 percent of indi-
viduals did not make changes to individual life insurance coverage as their ESLI coverage changed.
previous income.
19Data limitation prevent analysis of longer run eﬀects.
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As discussed above, job changers should be more responsive in comparison to existing employees.
Therefore, the substitution between the individual and ESLI for job changers likely represents an
upper bound for the actual level of substitution. Hence, we conclude that crowd-out between the
group and non-group market is minimal, suggesting that increases in total ESLI coverage represent
increases in total life insurance holdings for a majority of employees.
VII. DESIRABILITY OF NUDGE
To gauge the desirability of the nudge, we evaluate employee holdings relative to ﬁnancial plan-
ners' recommendations. We use a life insurance needs calculator from Prudential to approximate
the recommended coverage for each individual. The algorithm uses age, gender, marital status,
annual salary, number of children and age of the youngest child for the recommendation.20
The University data contain information on all these measures with the exception of number of
children and age of youngest child. For 52 percent of the sample, which do not have children, this
limitation is inconsequential. For the portion of the sample with children, we turn to the American
Community Survey (ACS) from 2005 to 2013, which has information on number of children and
their ages. To obtain a sample of likely employees of the University, we restrict observations to
full-time employees of a university or college that reside in the same geographical location as the
University. We then impute number of children and age of the youngest child using random draws
from the ACS sample conditioned on gender and age bin. With this information, we approximate
the recommended amount of coverage for each employee.
To analyze the eﬀects of the increase in basic coverage, we look at coverage averages from 2007
and 2008 in comparison to the average recommended amount. Figure Va shows that the mean
multiple of ESLI coverage in 2007 is signiﬁcantly below the mean recommended multiple. The
diﬀerence between recommended total coverage and actual ESLI coverage is largest for those aged
30 to 40 and then decreases for older individuals. The increase in basic coverage lessened the gap
between recommended and actual coverage. However, the increase in basic coverage also induced
20The calculator uses data from the Federal Reserve 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, College Board, 2012
Bureau of Labor Statistics NAHB Survey, Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, and
the Consumer Expenditure Survey to calibrate the model. Estimated needs seems to reﬂect the principal purpose
for life insurance of replacing the lost earnings of a breadwinner. For example, needs decrease as an individual
approaches retirement. Nonetheless, Prudential sells life insurance and may have the incentive to overestimate
needs. The website explicitly states that the amount given should be a starting point for estimating needs. See
https://isso.prudential.com/simpliﬁedneeds/life for documentation on the needs calculator.
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excessive coverage for the oldest employees.
Given that employees do not react to changes in basic coverage, we examine the increase to
1x salary in comparison to alternative policies. The disparity between recommended and actual
coverage is greater for lower paid and younger employees. Provision of 1x salary in basic coverage
inherently favors those with higher salaries and older employees (where premiums are signiﬁcantly
higher). Hence, uniform provision of a multiple of salary in basic coveragealthough the most
common form of basic life insurance (57 percent)is not the most eﬀective for reducing the average
disparity. An alternative policy, which is used for 38 percent of workers with basic coverage, is to
provide a ﬁxed amount of coverage (keeping total expenditures constant: $59,024) to each employee
eliminating the advantage for higher earners (Figure Vb) (LIMRA, 2015a). This policy decreases
the disparities more relative to 1x salary but still induces excessive coverage for the oldest employees.
Inherently, this policy redistributes to lower paid employees. Providing a ﬁxed amount of coverage
however, does not address the concern that younger employees generally have larger disparities in
coverage.
A ﬁnal policy, which is not commonly used, is to provide equal dollar contributions toward
premiums for each employee (keeping total expenditures constant: $146). This policy would not
favor the higher paid employees and would implicitly provide more coverage for the young who face
lower premiums. Figure Vc shows that this scenario decreases the disparity between recommended
and actual coverage more eﬀectively than a ﬁxed beneﬁt or multiple of salary. One important caveat
with these alternative policy predictions is they assume the same level of crowd-out as provision of
1x salary, which might not be the case. For example, a 30-year-old employee that makes $30,000
would receive 5x salary in coverage under the equal dollar contribution (rather than 1x) which would
likely elicit more crowd-out. Nonetheless, the alternative policies discussed do provide some insight
into design for basic coverage to more closely align coverage with recommended levels.
If ESLI was the only avenue for obtaining life insurance, we could conclude that the increase in
basic coverage in 2008 helped the average employee obtain an amount closer to the recommended
level. However, the existence of the individual market makes this conclusion less certain.
Those individuals at an interior solution of 1x to 2x salary in 2007 probably do not have indi-
vidual market coverage. If individual market coverage were the better option then they should not
have any supplemental ESLI. Conversely, if ESLI were the better option, then they should elect the
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maximum supplemental ESLI multiple prior to purchasing any individual life insurance. Therefore,
diﬀerences between actual and recommended coverage likely represent disparities in insurance rather
than inability to observe full life insurance holdings for the 22 percent at an interior in 2007.
Next, we consider individuals who have no supplemental ESLI or have 3x salary in 2007. Using
the SIPP, we identify individuals who work at universities or colleges for a rough comparison.
Given the data obtained through the beneﬁt books, we use the modal provision of 1x salary for
our assumption of basic ESLI coverage. We also assume individuals that have more than 1x salary
in ESLI were constrained by a maximum. With these assumptions, 39 percent of individuals with
no supplemental coverage and 29 percent that had more than 1x salary additionally had individual
market life insurance coverage.
Under these assumptions, approximately 30 percent of all employees at the University have
some individual life insurance. If these 30 percent of employees represent those with the greatest
disparities, then the overall disparity in coverage could be much less than Figure Va illustrates.
Looking at averages ignores heterogeneity in life insurance needs among University employees.
Figure VIa depicts how the increase in basic coverage inﬂuenced total ESLI holdings relative to
recommended levels. In 2007, 33 percent of employees had more than the recommended amount
principally due to not having a spouse or child. The increase in basic coverage caused a 7 percentage
point increase in employees with more than the recommended amount of coverage. This highlights
the major trade-oﬀ for the employer of inducing too much coverage for those who either do not need
coverage or already have enough and not inducing enough coverage for those that have less than
the recommended amount.
Figure VIb shows that the increase in basic coverage caused a 15 percentage point increase in
those with at least the recommended level of coverage (from 13 to 28 percent) for employees aged
18-34. The ﬁgure also shows a 22 percent decrease in the number of employees that had less than half
of the recommend level (signiﬁcantly under-insured) and an 8 percent increase in individuals having
more than twice the recommended coverage (over-insured) in part due to not having a dependent.
Figure VIc shows that the oldest employees (aged 50-64) were more likely to have at least the
recommended level in 2007 (50 percent). The biggest eﬀect was the 12 percentage point decrease
in those that were signiﬁcantly under-insured.
Another aspect to consider with provision of basic life insurance is the individual market re-
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sponse. ESLI coverage is inferior to term life insurance because ESLI is conditional on employment
whereas term is conditional on premium payments alone. If someone loses their job they simulta-
neously lose ESLI coverage. Would it be better for the employer to remove the option of ESLI?
Earlier we found that roughly 1 in 10 would purchase individual market coverage in response to a
lapse in ESLI. Therefore, even though term life insurance is a more complete form of life insurance
not enough people would take it up in response to an employer forgoing ESLI coverage to increase
overall life insurance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 2008, a large public university increased provision of basic life insurance coverage to employees.
Contrary to theory, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant levels of inertia and full pass-through of the increase in basic
life insurance for existing employees with supplemental coverage. In addition, we ﬁnd considerable
levels of inertia for highly compensated employees who were initially constrained by a maximum
contribution limit. However, new employees, who were forced to make an active decision, decreased
supplemental coverage. Therefore, we conclude that the increase in total coverage is driven by
inertia.
Death in the working age population is a low probability event with catastrophic consequences
that can be mitigated through life insurance. However, life insurance ownership is at a 50-year
low and research shows uninsured vulnerabilities (Bernheim et al., 2003; Prudential, 2013). Con-
sequently, diﬃculties arise for many surviving dependents. Using Danish data, Fadlon and Nielsen
(2015) ﬁnd that widows increase their labor force participation by 10-11 percent to compensate
for lost earnings. In addition, McGarry and Schoeni (2005) ﬁnd high rates of widow poverty in
the U.S. due in part to insuﬃcient life insurance. Our ﬁndings shed further light on the potential
role of behavioral economics in reducing disparities between recommended and actual levels of life
insurance coverage.
We show that the increase in basic life insurance to 1x salary reduced disparities between recom-
mended and actual levels for two-thirds of the University's employees. Given the lack of signiﬁcant
crowd-out, it appears that many ﬁrms with basic coverage below 1x salary could nudge employees
to have more coverage without signiﬁcant employee response. The question remains of how far em-
ployers could go before inducing signiﬁcant crowd-out. Could more ambitious expenditure neutral
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policies like ﬁxed contributions be eﬀective? The outcome is speculative, but considering our results
of high levels of inertia and only partial crowd-out for those who make active decisions, it is likely
that such a policy would increase total coverage.
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Figure I: Interior Solution
Note: Figure not drawn to scale. BC0 represents the initial budget con-
straint with optimal bundle A. BC1 is the budget constraint which depicts
the increased provision of basic life insurance (1x salary) and the expanded
maximum multiple. The optimal bundle for BC1 is given by B. Due to a
small income eﬀect and discrete choices, the employee will optimally elect
2x salary in total coverage both before and after the policy change.
30
Figure II: Supplemental ESLI Participation: University Data
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Figure III: Evidence of Inertia: Life Insurance Multiples
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Note: The ﬁgure considers continuously employed full-time workers who purchased 1-2x
salary in supplemental coverage in 2007.
32
Figure IV: Life Insurance Participation Trends: SIPP
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Note: The ﬁgure uses data from the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP
limited to individuals aged 18-64.
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Figure V: Recommended versus Actual Coverage: Expenditure Constant Policy Options
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Note: Panel (a) depicts the actual eﬀects of the increase in basic coverage from $10,000 to 1x salary. Panel (b)
shows the alternative of providing a ﬁxed dollar amount of coverage ($59,024). Panel (c) represents spending an
equal amount (the average premium paid for 1x salary: $146) on each employee calculated using the supplemental
premium schedule. The sample consists of employees at a large public university in ﬁscal years 2007 and 2008. The
recommended multiple comes from Prudential's life insurance needs calculator.
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Figure VI: Recommended Versus Coverage with Provision of 1x Salary in Basic Coverage: CDF
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Note: Panel (a) shows the CDF for employees aged 18-64. Panels (b) and (c) show the CDFs for the youngest and
oldest employees respectively. The sample consists of employees at a large public university in ﬁscal years 2007 and
2008. The recommended multiple comes from Prudential's life insurance needs calculator.
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Table I: Employer-Sponsored Life Insurance Policy Details
Pre (2006-2007) Post (2008-present)
Basic $10,000 1x salary
(≈ 0.2x salary) (≈ $50k)
Supplemental 1-3x salary 1-5x salary
Maximum $375k $1m
Max. w/out medical underwriting $375k $375k
Rating 5-year Age Bins 5-year Age Bins
Increase Coverage Open Enrollment Open Enrollment
Decrease Coverage Anytime Anytime
Monthly price/$1,000 2006 2007-present
Age<35 $0.05 $0.08
Age 35-39 $0.06 $0.09
Age 40-44 $0.10 $0.10
Age 45-49 $0.17 $0.15
Age 50-54 $0.28 $0.25
Age 55-59 $0.44 $0.43
Age 60-64 $0.69 $0.69
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Table II: Summary Statistics and ESLI Participation:
University Data; Numbers in percents unless denoted otherwise
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Demographics
Male 38.2 38.1 37.3 37.3 36.9 36.6 36.3 36.5 36.0
Age (years) 42.4 43.4 43.6 43.7 43.7 43.8 43.6 43.8 43.7
White (non-Hispanic) 86.0 86.1 85.8 85.8 85.7 85.7 85.8 85.8 85.9
Married 47.6 48.4 49.2 49.7 49.4 49.4 48.7 48.3 47.5
Child 44.6 45.7 47.1 47.8 48.4 49.2 49.2 49.6 49.1
Employment
Nominal Salary ($1,000) 38.0 39.0 41.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 44.0 45.0 46.0
Faculty 16.0 16.1 15.6 15.6 15.5 15.4 15.2 15.2 14.8
Staﬀ 84.0 83.9 84.4 84.4 84.5 84.6 84.8 84.8 85.2
Main Campus 75.5 75.5 72.6 63.9 62.2 61.7 60.0 59.5 58.1
Healthcare 24.5 24.5 27.4 36.1 37.8 38.3 40.0 40.5 41.9
Elections
Health Ins. 89.6 91.5 91.5 91.6 92.0 92.7 92.5 93.3 93.4
Health FSA 15.6 17.4 17.3 17.0 19.1 18.2 18.4 18.6 18.8
Voluntary 403(b) 12.0 13.9 14.5 13.7 12.6 13.0 12.8 12.6 12.6
Voluntary 457(b) 4.2 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6
ADD Ins. 49.7 53.2 52.9 51.0 48.6 47.4 46.1 45.5 44.6
Vision Ins. 39.0 42.4 46.1 47.7 49.8 51.3 53.5 55.3 57.2
Dental Ins. 66.0 69.1 68.4 70.6 71.5 73.3 74.1 75.3 76.6
Supplemental Life Insurance 52.2 54.8 56.2 54.4 52.4 50.8 49.4 48.7 47.8
Multiple (0x-5x) 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Multiple (1x-5x) 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Observations 11,883 11,479 11,748 12,244 12,859 12,983 13,393 13,465 13,586
ESLI Supplemental Participation by Group
Age Bins
Age<35 40.0 43.4 45.8 41.2 36.4 33.3 30.8 29.6 28.7
Age 35-39 58.4 60.1 63.6 60.6 57.4 54.3 51.1 49.5 48.5
Age 40-44 61.7 65.2 66.6 65.1 63.6 60.9 60.2 60.1 58.0
Age 45-49 60.5 63.1 63.9 63.4 64.3 63.5 62.8 60.8 59.8
Age 50-54 54.6 57.6 59.6 60.1 59.5 60.3 60.0 60.1 58.9
Age 55-59 53.1 52.4 51.8 51.8 51.6 51.1 52.5 52.9 53.2
Age 60-64 44.4 44.8 44.2 44.5 44.3 44.3 44.2 43.8 44.7
Income Bins
<$20,000 31.3 35.4 35.3 32.9 30.9 29.6 22.2 25.6 21.2
$20,000-$49,999 49.6 52.7 54.2 52.2 49.4 47.5 46.1 45.3 43.5
$50,000-$99,999 62.2 62.8 63.7 61.5 60.9 59.6 58.2 56.6 56.0
$100,000-$149,999 56.7 57.8 56.9 56.3 56.4 57.0 56.7 56.6 56.2
$150,000+ 51.7 53.0 50.7 48.2 43.9 41.9 38.2 36.8 36.9
Race/Ethnicity
White (non-Hispanic) 53.1 55.5 56.7 54.8 52.6 51.0 49.8 49.0 48.1
Black (non-Hispanic) 45.6 50.2 54.7 52.7 51.7 51.2 49.0 49.6 49.1
Other 48.8 51.5 51.3 50.3 49.7 45.5 43.8 42.2 40.2
Employer Group
Faculty 53.5 54.1 54.4 51.5 49.8 48.2 45.9 44.2 44.1
Staﬀ 51.9 55.0 56.6 54.9 52.9 51.2 50.0 49.5 48.4
Main Campus 52.3 54.1 55.6 53.4 51.6 50.0 49.1 48.0 47.4
Healthcare 52.0 57.2 57.8 56.2 53.6 52.0 49.8 49.7 48.3
Gender
Female 51.2 54.7 56.0 54.2 52.1 50.4 49.0 48.7 47.6
Male 53.8 55.1 56.7 54.7 52.9 51.4 50.1 48.7 48.0
Note: Median Salary (rather than mean) is reported due to top coding at $375,000. The sample consists of
employees aged 18-64 who are eligible for ESLI.
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Table III: University Comparison, Maximum Eﬀective Multiple
Age 30 Age 65
School Name $35k $100k $400k $35k $100k $400k
American University 6.0 6.0 4.8 6.0 6.0 4.8
Amherst College 6.5 6.5 1.9 6.0 6.0 1.9
Anderson University 6.1 5.4 1.4 4.0 3.5 0.9
Andrews University 9.9 8.0 2.1 9.9 8.0 2.1
Arizona State University 4.4 4.2 3.5 4.4 4.2 3.5
Austin College 6.5 6.5 2.8 6.5 6.5 2.8
Austin Peay State University 8.4 5.5 1.4 7.9 5.3 1.3
Bates College 4.0 4.0 2.1 4.0 4.0 2.1
Belmont University 6.0 6.0 1.5 4.3 4.3 1.1
Beloit College 15.3 5.5 1.4 15.3 5.5 1.4
Bennington College 15.3 6.0 1.8 9.9 3.9 1.1
Bentley University 6.0 6.0 2.4 6.0 6.0 2.4
Berea College 6.5 4.5 1.5 6.5 4.5 1.5
Boston College 6.0 6.0 3.5 5.0 5.0 3.3
Bradley University 6.0 5.8 1.4 5.6 5.5 1.4
Bryant University 4.0 4.0 2.5 4.0 4.0 2.5
Buena Vista University 7.0 7.0 2.4 7.0 7.0 2.4
Carnegie Mellon University 5.0 5.0 2.5 5.0 5.0 2.5
Castleton State College 6.4 5.5 1.4 4.3 3.6 0.9
Charles R. Drew University of Medicine & Science 6.0 6.0 1.5 3.9 3.9 1.0
Clarkson University 4.0 3.7 1.4 4.0 3.7 1.4
Colorado State University 16.3 5.7 1.4 16.3 5.7 1.4
Cornell College 8.0 6.0 2.0 8.0 6.0 2.0
Cornish College of the Arts 6.0 6.0 5.6 4.5 4.5 4.2
Drake University 16.3 7.0 3.3 16.3 7.0 3.3
Drury University 6.0 6.0 2.0 3.9 3.9 1.3
Eastern Kentucky University 6.0 5.5 5.1 6.0 5.5 5.1
Eastern Michigan University 7.0 7.0 1.9 4.6 4.6 1.3
Flagler College 5.7 5.3 1.6 5.7 5.3 1.6
George Mason University 7.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 6.0
George Washington University 6.4 6.0 2.9 6.4 6.0 2.9
Kansas State University 8.6 4.0 2.1 8.6 4.0 2.1
Kentucky State University 6.4 5.5 1.4 5.9 5.3 1.3
Loyola University Chicago 6.5 6.5 2.5 4.8 4.8 2.1
Michigan State University 9.0 8.5 5.1 6.2 5.7 3.4
Mississippi State University 7.0 6.0 2.1 7.0 6.0 2.1
Mount Holyoke College 5.7 5.3 1.3 5.3 5.1 1.3
Ohio Northern University 6.4 5.5 1.4 6.4 5.5 1.4
Oklahoma State University System 7.0 7.0 2.4 7.0 7.0 2.4
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education 8.1 8.1 3.8 5.3 5.3 2.5
Pittsburg State University 8.6 4.0 2.1 8.6 4.0 2.1
Principia College 7.0 7.0 2.6 7.0 7.0 2.6
Purdue University System 9.5 9.5 6.3 6.7 6.7 4.5
Randolph-Macon College 7.0 7.0 1.8 7.0 7.0 1.8
Saint Michael's College 7.0 7.0 2.5 7.0 7.0 2.5
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Table III (continued): University Comparison, Maximum Eﬀective Multiple
Age 30 Age 65
School Name $35k $100k $400k $35k $100k $400k
Saint Petersburg College 6.0 6.0 1.9 6.0 6.0 1.9
South Texas College of Law 7.0 7.0 3.3 7.0 7.0 3.3
Southern Utah University 16.3 7.0 2.3 16.3 7.0 2.3
Southern Vermont College 4.3 1.5 0.4 2.8 1.0 0.2
Syracuse University 11.4 10.5 5.1 10.9 10.3 5.1
Texas A&M University System 6.6 6.2 3.8 6.6 6.2 3.8
Tufts University 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Tulane University 6.4 5.5 2.6 6.4 5.5 2.6
University of Alaska System 12.9 4.5 1.1 2.1 0.8 0.2
University of Central Missouri 6.0 6.0 3.1 5.7 5.7 3.1
University of Chicago 8.0 8.0 3.8 8.0 8.0 3.8
University of Dallas 6.0 4.0 1.0 6.0 4.0 1.0
University of Kentucky 6.0 6.0 3.5 6.0 6.0 3.5
University of Louisville 10.6 5.0 1.3 10.6 5.0 1.3
University of Maine System 6.0 6.0 3.5 6.0 6.0 3.5
University of Minnesota System 6.2 6.2 3.0 6.2 6.2 3.0
University of Mississippi 8.0 7.0 6.3 8.0 7.0 6.3
University of Montana System 18.5 6.5 1.6 18.5 6.5 1.6
University of Northern Iowa 10.1 4.5 1.4 9.7 4.1 1.2
University of Southern Indiana 9.5 5.8 1.4 9.5 5.8 1.4
University of Texas System 6.6 6.2 3.8 6.6 6.2 3.8
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University 6.0 6.0 3.9 6.0 6.0 3.9
Washington College 4.5 3.9 1.2 4.5 3.9 1.2
Western Kentucky University 15.3 5.4 1.3 15.3 5.4 1.3
Yale University 5.7 5.3 2.5 5.7 5.3 2.5
Note: Summary statistics from Table 16, 17, 18, of March 2013 National Compensation Survey. Statistics
on full-time and part-time workers not available at industry level.
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Table IV: National Compensation Survey 2013, ESLI
All Industries Education Colleges &
All Workers Full-time Part-time Services Universities
Access 60% 75% 15% 76% 83%
(0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (1.1) (1.6)
Take-up 97% 98% 88% 98% 96%
(0.2) (0.2) (2.1) (0.4) (1.2)
Structure
Multiple of Salary 56% 56% 55% 42% 60%
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (2.1) (3.8)
Flat Dollar 39% 39% 38% 51% 33%
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (2.1) (3.8)
Multiple
1x 61% - - 48% 51%
(1.1) (3.9) (6.3)
2x 22% - - 26% 28%
(1.0) (5.0) (8.1)
Mean 1.3x - - 1.4x 1.4x
Flat Dollar
25 percentile ($1k) 10 - - 10 10
50 percentile ($1k) 20 - - 20 20
90 percentile ($1k) 50 - - 50 50
Note: Summary statistics from Table 16, 17, 18, of March 2013 National Compensation Survey. Statistics
on full-time and part-time workers not available at industry level.
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Table V: Inertia Analysis Pre Period: 2006-2007; Post Period: 2008-2009
Dependent variable: Total Coverage Multiple (Employer Basic+ Worker Supplemental)
Constant Age Premium High Main Campus
All Premium 18-39 Increase Salary Faculty Staﬀ
Post Change 0.780∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.053) (0.060) (0.058) (0.051) (0.066) (0.035)
Age 0.460∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.073) (0.095) (0.077) (0.069) (0.083) (0.037)
Age Squared −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Annual Salary ($10k) −0.011 −0.066∗ −0.034 0.012 −0.017 −0.029 0.046
(0.019) (0.037) (0.054) (0.044) (0.025) (0.024) (0.037)
Healthcare 0.093∗∗ 0.009 0.124 −0.001 −0.138
(0.044) (0.096) (0.086) (0.093) (0.134)
Obs. 7,468 1,507 2,216 1,328 1,871 1,052 4,462
Individuals 1,867 608 616 332 532 263 1,174
∆Basic 0.738 0.751 0.708 0.745 0.874 0.866 0.709
Reject full pass through? No No Yes No No No No
p-value: [0.127] [0.989] [0.083] [0.548] [0.185] [0.248] [0.501]
Note: ∆Basic = Basic2008−Basic2007 and the formal hypothesis for full pass through is H0 : β1 = ∆Basic.
The sample is restricted to employees who are eligible for supplemental life insurance coverage, were present
continuously from 2006 to 2009. and had 1x or 2x salary in supplemental coverage in 2007. Post Change
indicates observations for 2008 and later. No Prem ∆ restricts the sample to employees aged 40-44 and 60-64
who did not experience a premium change in 2007. Premium Increase restricts the sample to employees who
age into a higher premium bracket in 2008. High Salary indicates being in the highest quartile (> $60k).
Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table VI: Active Changers Inertia Analysis, Pre Period: 2006-2007; Post Period: 2008-2009
Dependent variable: Total Coverage Multiple (Employer Basic+ Worker Supplemental)
Any Change Same Page ±1 Topic ±2 Topics
Post Change 0.798∗∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.121) (0.033) (0.030)
Age 0.469∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.116) (0.033) (0.030)
Age Squared −0.005∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual Salary ($10k) −0.019 −0.077 −0.038∗ −0.021
(0.020) (0.090) (0.022) (0.020)
Healthcare 0.086∗ 0.398∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.092∗
(0.048) (0.172) (0.055) (0.048)
Obs. 6,488 852 5,376 6,428
Individuals 1,622 213 1,344 1,607
∆Basic 0.743 0.736 0.744 0.743
Reject full pass through? Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value: [0.065] [0.006] [0.017] [0.067]
Note: ∆Basic = Basic2008−Basic2007 and the formal hypothesis for full pass through is H0 : β1 = ∆Basic.
The sample is restricted to employees who are eligible for supplemental life insurance coverage, were present
continuously from 2006 to 2009. and had 1x or 2x salary in supplemental coverage in 2007. Post Change
indicates observations for 2008 and later. Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1.
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Table VII: Long-Run Inertia Analysis, Pre Period: 2006-2007
Dependent variable: Total Coverage Multiple (Employer Basic+ Worker Supplemental)
Pre Period: 2006 & 2007 vs. 2006 & 2007 vs. 2006 & 2007 vs.
Post Period: 2009 & 2010 2011 & 2012 2013 & 2014
Post Change 0.747∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.083) (0.136)
Age 0.399∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Age Squared −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual Salary ($10k) 0.024 −0.014 −0.026∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
Healthcare 0.192∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.052) (0.060)
Obs. 6,872 5,776 4,804
Individuals 1,718 1,444 1,201
∆Basic 0.739 0.739 0.736
Reject full pass through? No No No
p-value: [0.857] [0.215] [0.266]
Note: ∆Basic = Basic2008−Basic2007 and the formal hypothesis for full pass through is H0 : β1 = ∆Basic.
The sample is restricted to employees who are eligible for supplemental life insurance coverage, were present
continuously from 2006 to the last year of comparison, and had 1x or 2x salary in supplemental coverage in
2007. Post Change indicates observations for 2008 and later. Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table VIII: New Hire Mean Comparison
University Data; Numbers in percents unless denoted otherwise
All Main Campus Healthcare
Hired: 06/07 08/09 06/07 08/09 06/07 08/09
Life Insurance
Basic Mult. of Salary 0.32 1.00∗∗∗ 0.32 1.00∗∗∗ 0.31 1.00∗∗∗
Supplemental Life Ins. 0.44 0.38∗∗∗ 0.45 0.33∗∗∗ 0.43 0.40
Multiple (0x-5x) 1.00 0.91∗∗ 1.00 0.83∗∗∗ 1.01 0.96
Multiple (1x-5x) 2.27 2.42∗∗∗ 2.22 2.49∗∗∗ 2.36 2.39
Demographics
Age (years) 35.48 37.60∗∗∗ 37.21 38.01∗ 32.53 37.33∗∗∗
Male 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.43∗∗ 0.19 0.22∗
Indicator for Children 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.48
Ever Married 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.43
White 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.92 0.87∗∗∗
Employment
Faculty 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.27∗∗∗ . .
Staﬀ 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.73∗∗∗ . .
Annual Salary ($1k) 42.69 47.19∗∗∗ 45.60 59.77∗∗∗ 37.72 38.90
Main Campus 0.63 0.40∗∗∗ . . . .
Healthcare 0.37 0.60∗∗∗ . . . .
Other Elections
Health Insurance 0.86 0.89∗∗∗ 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.88∗∗∗
Vision Insurance 0.53 0.55∗ 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.57
Dental Insurance 0.68 0.73∗∗∗ 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.75∗∗∗
Voluntary 403b 0.05 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.07∗∗∗
Voluntary 457b 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Observations 1,971 2,327 1,243 924 728 1,403
Note: The sample is restricted to the ﬁrst observation for individuals hired between 2006 and 2009 and who
are eligible to elect supplemental coverage. For mean and proportions comparisons: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1
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Table IX: Supplemental Crowd-out Estimation: New Hires, 2006 & 2007 vs. 2008 & 2009
Linear Probability Tobit: Marginal Eﬀects
All Ages Age 40-64 Age 18-39 All Ages Age 40-64 Age 18-39
Hired Post Change −0.094∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.038) (0.025)
Age (years) 0.054∗∗∗ 0.019 0.027 0.086∗∗∗ 0.021 0.054∗
(0.005) (0.031) (0.020) (0.008) (0.047) (0.028)
Age Squared −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.001 −0.006 0.001 0.008 −0.015 0.016
(0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.022) (0.039) (0.027)
Faculty −0.030 −0.033 −0.036 −0.031 −0.060 −0.033
(0.030) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040) (0.067) (0.051)
Hospital Staﬀ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) (0.040) (0.026)
Black 0.025 0.053 0.002 0.003 0.050 −0.032
(0.026) (0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.058) (0.046)
Other Race 0.026 0.107∗∗ −0.027 0.025 0.134∗ −0.034
(0.032) (0.054) (0.041) (0.044) (0.077) (0.053)
Annual Salary ($10k) −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Indicator for Children 0.137∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (0.039) (0.028)
Ever Married 0.112∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.037) (0.028)
Vision Insurance 0.062∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.019) (0.021) (0.039) (0.025)
Dental Insurance 0.078∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.029) (0.021) (0.024) (0.041) (0.028)
Obs. 4,298 1,603 2,695 4,298 1,603 2,695
Participation Hired 2007 0.496 0.582 0.450
Hired 2007: Ave. Multiple 1.077 1.276 0.972
∆Basic 0.838 0.869 0.824
Note: Hired Post Change indicates being hired in 2008 or 2009. The sample is restricted to the ﬁrst
observation for individuals hired between 2006 and 2009 and who are eligible to elect supplemental coverage.
The Tobit model accounts for the censoring at 3x and 5x salary respectively for the pre and post periods as
well as for the 0x lower bound. ∆Basic = Basic2008 −Basic2007. Marginal eﬀects report the eﬀect of being
hired after the change conditional on being at an interior multiple. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table X: Is There Crowd-Out of Individual Life Insurance? Examining Job Changers
Dependent Variable: Has Individual Life Insurance
Industry ∆ Gain Lose Health
All Same Occupation ESLI ESLI Excellent Good
ESLI −0.100∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011)
Obs. 54,668 3,870 50,784 50,142 10,850 24,384
Individuals 27,334 1,935 25,392 25,071 5,425 12,192
Note: Sample consists of individuals aged 18-64 without imputed life insurance that switched jobs between
waves. Industry change considers only individuals who keep the same occupation code, but changed indus-
tries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the household level ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1.
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Table XI: Is There Crowd-Out of Individual Life Insurance?
Examining Job Changers: Second Year
1st Year 2nd Year
ESLI −0.089∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
Obs. 10,912 10,912
Individuals 5,456 5,456
Note: Sample consists of individuals aged 18-64 without imputed
life insurance that switched jobs between waves and remained at
the same job for a second year. First year indicates the eﬀect
for the ﬁrst year of employment at the new ﬁrm. Second year
indicates the change from one year before the job change to the
second year at the new ﬁrm. Standard errors are shown in paren-
theses and clustered at the household level ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1.
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